

ANALYSIS OF THE LANGUAGE APPROACH IN DETERMINING THE LAW OF RIDDAH FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMANISM IN THE TAFSIRI OF AL-JAMI' LI AHKAM AL-QUR'AN BY AL-QURTHUBI

Abd. Jalil

Indonesian Islamic Da'wah College (STAI PTDII) Jakarta

jalilptdii@gmail.com

Abstract: *This study analyzes the linguistic approach employed by al-Qurthubi in determining the law of riddah (apostasy) from a humanistic perspective in his exegetical work al-Jāmi' li Ahkām al-Qur'ān. Using qualitative library research with a thematic exegesis method and Nashr Hamid Abu Zayd's textual reading framework, this study examines Qur'anic verses related to apostasy through lexicological, morphological, syntactic, semantic, and socio-historical contextual analysis. The findings reveal that a comprehensive linguistic analysis of the phrase *lā ikrāha fī al-dīn* firmly establishes religious freedom as a fundamental Qur'anic guarantee, while verses on riddah contain exclusively eschatological sanctions rather than worldly death penalties. Furthermore, the hadith *man baddala dīnahu*, when subjected to the principle of *al-mutlaq yuqayyad*, only applies to apostates who simultaneously engage in armed rebellion against the Muslim community. This study concludes that a thorough linguistic approach is indispensable for constructing a more humane, proportionate, and just Islamic legal understanding regarding apostasy.*

Keywords: *linguistic approach, riddah, humanism.*

INTRODUCTION

Humanism as an intellectual movement and ideology emerged as a reaction to the dehumanizing civilization of the Middle Ages, in which the union between religion (the church) and the state placed human beings as subjects who were entirely subordinate to doctrine in the name of God. Within that context, the primary discourse of human life revolved not around freedom in defining oneself and the world, but around the salvation of the soul and the atonement of sins. However, the concept of humanism in the secular Western perspective differs fundamentally from humanism in Islam, which is inherently religious in character. Western humanism positions the human being as the center of reality (*anthropocentrism*) and detaches itself from religion, whereas Islamic humanism holds that God and humanity are inseparable (*theocentrism*), even though a perfect boundary between the two remains intact. In Islam, the human being is the only creature endowed with the Divine Spirit and entrusted with God's covenant.¹

¹ Wardani et al., "Jarimah Al-Riddah from the Perspective of Islamic Law and Its Relevance in the Legal System in Indonesia."

Humanism in Islam is understood as a foundational concept that does not stand independently, but is consistently guided and protected by Islamic law in the effort to *humanize humanity*. This framework positions Islamic law not merely as a system of sanctions, but as an instrument for safeguarding the most fundamental human rights (*al-dharuriyyat*). Among the most debated punishments in the tradition of Islamic law is the death penalty, regarded as the most severe of all sanctions. The controversy surrounding capital punishment generally centers on differing views regarding the purpose of punishment: whether it is meant to penalize or to rehabilitate. Those who oppose the death penalty argue that the right to life is an absolute right of every human being that cannot be taken away under the principles of human rights, while those who support it contend that the death penalty produces a positive effect on society and serves as a necessary instrument for eliminating serious crimes that are beyond correction.²

One of the most persistently debated legal issues in Islam within this context is the question of *riddah*. In Islam, *riddah* is defined as the act of a Muslim departing from the religion of Islam, whether in the form of belief, speech, or deed. A Muslim who commits such an act is referred to as *al-murtadd*. The phenomenon of *riddah* is not new in Islamic history; it has existed since the time of the Prophet and has continued to develop as a complex discourse to the present day. In Indonesia, the issue of *riddah* carries particularly urgent relevance given the significant number of Muslims who undergo religious conversion each year.³

There exist sharply divergent views among Muslim scholars regarding the legal status of *riddah* and its sanctions. One group holds that a Muslim who commits *riddah* must be put to death, based on the Prophetic tradition "*man baddala dinahu fa uqtuluhu*" (whoever changes his religion, kill him), arguing that the sanction was imposed on account of "theological apostasy." Another group maintains that *riddah* does not warrant the death penalty, on the grounds that no verse in the Qur'an explicitly or implicitly prescribes a worldly punishment for those who apostatize. This latter group further argues that capital punishment for apostates contradicts the Qur'anic principle of *la ikraha fi al-din* (there is no compulsion in religion) and the freedom of religious conviction (*al-hurriyyat al-diniyyah*) guaranteed by the objectives of Islamic law (*maqashid al-syari'ah*). The long-codified prescription of death for apostasy, which has circulated widely in classical Islamic legal literature and become common knowledge,

² Dahlan and Ag, "Modern Fiqh Paradigm in Indonesia : A Study of Nurcholish Majid ' s Thought."

³Zainal Abidin, *Filsafat Manusia; Memahami Manusia Melalui Filsafat*, Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosdakarya, 2011, h. 7.

cannot be denied as one of the contributing factors to the rise of extremist ideologies and movements that readily justify the shedding of blood of those deemed to have left Islam.⁴

It is within this context that the interpretation of Qur'anic verses concerning religious freedom and *riddah* becomes critically significant. The Qur'an as a *worldview* constitutes the very foundation of Islamic humanism, and it was revealed through the medium of the Arabic language as the primary and foremost source. Every verse of the Qur'an contains the potential for multiple interpretations (*yahtamil wujuh al-ma'na*), shaped by the scholarly background, inclinations, motivations, ideological leanings, and historical context of each interpreter. The linguistic approach stands as one of the most indispensable methodologies in Qur'anic exegesis. Mastery of Arabic linguistic sciences such as lexicology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics is an absolute prerequisite for undertaking interpretation. Yusuf Qardlawi has asserted that the primary cause of errors in Qur'anic interpretation is insufficient knowledge of the Arabic language. A thorough understanding of the lexical meaning, historical context of a given term, and linguistic structure is therefore highly determinative of the character and direction of any resulting interpretation.⁵

Among the *fiqh*-oriented works of Qur'anic exegesis (*tafsir ahkam*) that have been most influential and most frequently cited as primary references on the legal question of *riddah* is *al-Jami' li Ahkam al-Qur'an* by al-Qurthubi. This work represents the most comprehensive and authoritative treatise in the field of Qur'anic legal scholarship, in which al-Qurthubi employs a systematic method of interpretation: unpacking meaning through linguistic analysis, citing related verses, adducing prophetic traditions as legal evidence, quoting and deliberating the views of scholars with their respective arguments, and ultimately comparing and preferring the opinion he deems most valid. Al-Qurthubi also explicitly asserts that the linguistic approach, together with all its subsidiary disciplines, constitutes a legitimate instrument of interpretation and does not fall within the category of prohibited exegesis. Through an examination of the linguistic approach al-Qurthubi employs in interpreting Qur'anic verses on *riddah*, it becomes possible to uncover how the linguistic structure of the Qur'an itself participates in shaping the construction of Islamic law, particularly in its relationship to humanistic values.⁶

⁴ Mujib et al., "Religious Freedom and Riddah through the Maqāṣidī Interpretation of Ibn 'Āshūr."

⁵ Rokhmadi et al., "Understanding Riddah in Islamic Jurisprudence: Between Textual Interpretation and Human Rights."

⁶ Ali Syari'ati, *Humanisme antara Islam dan Mazhab Barat*, diterjemahkan oleh Afif Muhammad dari judul *al-Insan, al-Islam wa Madaris al-Gharb*, Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1996, h. 39.

Based on the background elaborated above, this study focuses on the central question: how does al-Qurthubi's linguistic approach determine the legal ruling on *riddah* in his *tafsir al-Jami' li Ahkam al-Qur'an* when examined from the perspective of humanism? From this central question, four specific sub-questions are derived: first, what are the Islamic and Western paradigms regarding humanism; second, what is the legal ruling on *riddah* and its sanctions as presented in *al-Jami' li Ahkam al-Qur'an* by al-Qurthubi; third, how does the linguistic approach operate in determining the legal ruling on *riddah* within that work; and fourth, what is the significance of the linguistic approach and what influence does it exert on the determination of the legal ruling on *riddah*.

This study aims to identify and analyze the Islamic and Western paradigms regarding humanism in a comparative manner. Furthermore, it aims to critically examine al-Qurthubi's views on the legal ruling of *riddah* and its sanctions as articulated in *al-Jami' li Ahkam al-Qur'an*, while simultaneously subjecting the linguistic approach he employs in that process of legal determination to critical scrutiny. Beyond this, the study aims to articulate and elucidate the significance of the linguistic approach and its influence on the determination of the legal ruling on *riddah* within the Islamic exegetical tradition.

Theoretically, this study is expected to make a significant contribution to the literature in two intersecting fields: the study of humanism from Islamic and Western perspectives, and the study of *tafsir ahkam*, particularly with regard to *riddah* and the indispensable role of linguistic methodology in Qur'anic interpretation. The study is also expected to produce a scientifically grounded theoretical construction concerning the legal ruling on *riddah* and its sanctions, derived from a rigorous analysis of Qur'anic texts. Practically, this research is expected to inspire Muslim thinkers to more deeply explore the humanistic dimensions embedded in the Qur'an, to broaden the understanding that the Qur'an is fundamentally a book of humanity revealed for the benefit and welfare of mankind, and to serve as a more mature and considered reference for Muslims in approaching the issue of *riddah* and its legal consequences in a manner that is proportionate and just.

RESEARCH METHOD

Object and Research Approach

This study examines al-Qurthubi's linguistic approach in determining the law of *riddah* from a humanistic perspective as reflected in his exegetical work *al-Jāmi' li Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. The selection of this object aims to critically evaluate the linguistic approach employed by al-

Qurthubi while simultaneously using it as an entry point to critique the views of scholars who share similar positions, particularly those recorded in classical jurisprudential works (*al-turāts*) that discuss the law of riddah. This research is a library research (*library research*) employing a qualitative approach, since the data presented are in the form of sentences and documents that prioritize quality and accuracy over numerical or statistical analysis. The method applied is the thematic exegesis method (*al-tafsīr al-maudhū'ī*), which involves collecting Qur'anic verses that address the same theme, analyzing each verse, connecting the general with the specific, the absolute (*muṭlaq*) with the qualified (*muqayyad*), and enriching the explanation with relevant hadith, so as to arrive at a comprehensive and thorough conclusion regarding the theme under study.

Data Sources

The data sources in this study are divided into two categories, namely primary data and secondary data. Primary data refers to data taken from the first-hand source, which in this case is the exegetical work *al-Jāmi' li Ahkām al-Qur'ān* by al-Qurthubi, while secondary data refers to information obtained from second-hand sources, consisting of works related to the focus of this research. To facilitate the tracing of Qur'anic verses related to the law of riddah, the work *al-Mu'jam al-Mufahras li Alfāz al-Qur'ān* by Muhammad Fu'ād 'Abd al-Bāqī is utilized. The secondary data sources include exegetical works by classical and contemporary scholars as well as scholarly writings by researchers manifested in books related to the law of riddah, whether from linguistic, historical, or rational-scientific perspectives.

Data Collection and Analysis Techniques

The data collection process begins with gathering Qur'anic verses related to the theme of riddah, whether using the term *al-irtidād* or the term *al-kufr ba'd al-īmān*, followed by examining their interpretations in *al-Jāmi' li Ahkām al-Qur'ān* and comparing them with the works of other exegetes. This process is complemented by an exploration of rational-scientific studies on riddah as well as an investigation of interpretations recorded across various exegetical works. In analyzing the data, this study adopts the reading method of Nashr Hamid Abu Zayd, namely the study of the Qur'anic text as a linguistic text from the perspectives of structure (*tarkīb*) and semantics (*dilālah*) and its relationship with intertextuality (*tanāṣṣ*) within a particular cultural context. The analysis is carried out through several stages: tracing the meaning of words from the perspective of root words (*mufradāt*) through lexicology, analyzing morphological changes (*al-ṣarf*), syntactic structures (*al-naḥw*), rhetoric (*al-balāghah*), and semantics (*dilālah*), and subsequently analyzing the verses within the historical, social, and

political context (*al-siyāq al-tārīkhī al-ijtimā'ī wa al-siyāsī*) that surrounds both the revelation of the verses and the formation of al-Qurthubi's interpretations.

Data Validity Checking

To verify the validity of the data, two criteria are applied: the credibility criterion, which demonstrates the trustworthiness of research findings through evidence-based verification, and the confirmability criterion, which examines the degree of subjectivity or objectivity of a finding based on the agreement of multiple parties regarding a particular conclusion. Both criteria are applied consistently throughout every stage of the data analysis process. In addition, a triangulation technique is employed through the comparative analysis of Qur'anic verse interpretations concerning the law of riddah against the views of both classical and contemporary exegetes. This comparison also involves exegetical works that employ different methods, approaches, and tendencies, as well as other data sources such as historical and Arabic linguistic texts, with the aim of preventing subjectivity and ensuring the accuracy of data drawn from exegetes who lived within different social realities and cultural contexts.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Linguistic Approach to Religious Freedom in Tafsīr Al-Jāmi' li Aḥkām Al-Qur'ān

In interpreting Surah al-Baqarah verse 256, al-Qurthubi structures his commentary into three main areas of discussion: the circumstances of the verse's revelation, the legal ruling on coercion in embracing Islam, and an analysis from a linguistic standpoint. In explaining the reasons for the verse's revelation, al-Qurthubi cites several differing narrations, ranging from Ibn Abbas's narration about an Ansari woman who vowed to raise her surviving child as a Jew, al-Suddi's narration about Abu al-Hushain whose sons converted to Christianity, to Ibn al-Qasim's narration attributed to Imam Malik concerning war captives. The diversity of these narrations demonstrates that the contextual background of this verse was in fact deeply intertwined with the complex socio-religious dynamics of early Islam. Regarding the legal ruling on religious coercion, al-Qurthubi presents five differing scholarly opinions. Some scholars, such as Sulaiman bin Musa, argued that the prohibition against coercion was no longer applicable as it had been abrogated by the verses of warfare. Others, including Qatadah and al-Hasan al-Basri, maintained that the verse remained valid but applied exclusively to the People of the Book who paid the jizyah. Meanwhile, Ibn Jubair, al-Sya'bi, and Mujahid held that the verse remained universally applicable and that Islam grants every individual the freedom to choose the religion they believe in. In his linguistic analysis, al-Qurthubi employs several

linguistic disciplines separately rather than comprehensively. He analyzes the word al-dīn using a lexicological approach, defining it as al-mu'taqad wa al-millah, examines al-rusyd and al-ghayy from a morphological perspective, and studies the word al-thāghūt morphologically by referring to the views of Sibawaih and Abu Ali al-Farisi. Nevertheless, al-Qurthubi does not provide a thorough syntactic and rhetorical analysis, including a failure to analyze the phrase la ikrahā fi al-dīn as a complete and unified sentence structure.⁷

Linguistic Approach to the Law of Riddah in Tafsīr Al-Jāmi' li Aḥkām Al-Qur'ān

Al-Qurthubi defines riddah as the condition of a person who leaves Islam, which occurs when someone abandons all of Islamic law, acknowledges some Islamic obligations while rejecting others, or takes non-Muslims as protectors and allies against the Muslim community. In interpreting Surah al-Maidah verse 54, he structures his discussion to encompass syntactic analysis and qirā'āt, the interpretation of key phrases, and a presentation of scholarly disagreements regarding who is meant by the people whom Allah will bring as replacements for those who apostatize. Al-Qurthubi supports the opinion that these people are the Yemeni tribes of the Ash'ariyyun, citing a hadith reported by al-Hakim in which the Prophet pointed to Abu Musa al-Ash'ari when the verse was revealed. Regarding the punishment for riddah, al-Qurthubi presents scholarly disagreements on three main aspects: the death penalty, the fate of the apostate's good deeds, and the ruling on their inheritance. On the matter of the death penalty, some scholars argued that the apostate must first be asked to repent within varying time periods, while others such as Ubaid bin Umayr, Thawus, and al-Hasan al-Basri held that the apostate should be executed immediately without being asked to repent. Al-Qurthubi himself supports the position of Imam Malik, al-Shafi'i, and Layth ibn Sa'd, stating that the death penalty applies to both male and female apostates, citing the hadith man baddala dīnahu fa uqtulūhu which uses the word man that encompasses both genders. Al-Qurthubi does not provide an in-depth elaboration on the context and background of a person's apostasy in determining the appropriate punishment. He only presents the legal position normatively as established in mainstream Islamic jurisprudence without critically examining whether such a punishment has any relevance to the socio-historical context at the time the verses were revealed. His view aligns

⁷ David Jery dan Julia Jery, *The Harper Collins Dictionary of Sociology*, New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 1991, h. 218.

with the position of the majority of scholars who prescribe the death penalty for apostates without exception and without considering the motive and context of the apostasy itself.⁸

The Death Penalty between Riddah and Religious Freedom

The imposition of the death penalty for apostasy has drawn sharp criticism from a number of contemporary scholars. Mahmud Shaltut, for instance, argued that such a punishment must be reconsidered because unbelief itself does not fall within the category of factors that render a person's blood lawful to shed. In his view, what makes an apostate's blood lawful is the active act of attacking, opposing, and attempting to lead Muslims back into unbelief. This position is reinforced by Ali Jum'ah, who states that the death penalty for apostates is not solely because of their apostasy, but rather because of their deliberate efforts to divide the Muslim community and destabilize it. Thaha Jabir al-Alwani firmly asserts that among the many Quranic verses addressing apostasy, not a single one prescribes a worldly punishment. All sanctions mentioned are exclusively of an eschatological nature, as the Quran explicitly guarantees and protects freedom of belief. A similar view is expressed by Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, who argues that the wars waged against apostates during the era of Abu Bakr were not merely because of a change in creed, but because those individuals simultaneously abandoned Islam in terms of faith, community, and governance, and organized military forces to attack the state. Therefore, the punishment imposed was not because of their freedom of belief, but because of their acts of treason and aggression against the state. Jawdat Said and Jamal al-Banna further criticize the hadith *man baddala dīnahu* from the perspectives of both chain of transmission and textual content. The hadith is considered problematic because it does not mention the cause, time, or place of its utterance, and is transmitted through the chain of Ikrimah, whose credibility has been questioned by hadith scholars. Furthermore, the text of the hadith encompasses religious conversion in general, including a non-Muslim who converts to Islam, meaning that if applied literally, it would produce an absurd legal ruling. The historical fact of the Treaty of Hudaibiyah, in which the Prophet allowed apostates to join the Quraysh without demanding that they be handed over for execution, also serves as strong evidence that apostasy alone does not automatically warrant the death penalty.⁹

⁸ R.L.Shinn, *New Directions in Theology Today, Volume VI. Man: The New Humanism*, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955, h, 24.

⁹F. Budi Hardiman, *Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia; Polemik dengan Agama dan Kebudayaan*, Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 2012, h. 1.

Analysis of the Linguistic Approach to Religious Freedom and the Law of Riddah

A linguistic analysis of the phrase *la ikrāha fī al-dīn* reveals layers of exceedingly rich meaning. From a lexicological perspective, the word *ikrāh* derives from a root meaning unwillingness and displeasure, while *al-ikrāh* in its gerund form means imposing upon another person something they do not desire, causing them to carry it out under compulsion. The word *al-dīn* preceded by the definite article *al-ta'rīf* refers specifically to Islam, and the use of *lā* as *harf nāfiyah li al-jins* negates all forms of coercion without exception. From a rhetorical perspective, the phrase *la ikrāha fī al-dīn* is structurally a declarative statement conveying the meaning of negation, making the most fitting interpretation that in Islam there is absolutely no form of coercion whatsoever, rather than merely a prohibition directed at specific parties against committing coercion. Interpreting this phrase as a declarative statement conveying negation carries fundamental theological implications. It conveys the message that Allah does not compel anyone to believe, that a person is free to embrace a religion other than Islam, free to enter and leave Islam, and that every choice carries its own consequences. The continuation of the verse *qad tabayyana al-rusyd min al-ghayy*, preceded by *qad* as a particle of affirmation, functions as a confirmation that the truth of Islam is abundantly clear, yet this clarity is not an instrument of coercion. Rather, it reinforces the point that in Islam coercion is unnecessary precisely because its truth is self-evident. This verse is further supported by semantically parallel verses in Surah *al-Kafirūn*, *Yunus*, and *al-Kahf*, all of which are Meccan surahs, demonstrating that the guarantee of religious freedom was present from the very earliest period of Islam. The linguistic analysis of the verses concerning *riddah*, particularly Surah *al-Baqarah* verse 217, reveals that the verse contains no message prescribing the death penalty for apostates. The phrase *wa man yartadid minkum 'an dīnihi fa yamut wa huwa kāfir* is entirely constructed in the form of declarative statements that carry an eschatological warning in meaning, namely the nullification of good deeds and the eternal dwelling of the apostate in hellfire. The socio-historical context of the verse's revelation within the incident of Abdullah ibn Jahsh's detachment further confirms that this verse is not about establishing a death penalty, but rather about warning Muslims to remain steadfast in faith amid the pressure and attacks of the Quraysh unbelievers who sought to return Muslims to unbelief. As for the hadith *man baddala dīnahu*, when the principle of *al-mutlaq yuqayyad* is applied alongside three other hadiths that use restricted wording requiring the element of *hirābah*, the death penalty applies only to an apostate

who simultaneously engages in armed resistance and betrayal against the Muslim community, and not merely because of a change in personal belief.¹⁰

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that the linguistic approach employed by al-Qurthubi in his tafsir al-Jāmi' li Ahkām al-Qur'ān, although methodologically rich, has not been fully consistent in producing legal conclusions regarding riddah that align with the humanistic values of Islam. A comprehensive linguistic analysis of the phrase *lā ikrāha fī al-dīn* demonstrates that the Qur'an explicitly guarantees religious freedom without any form of coercion, while apostasy-related verses such as Surah al-Baqarah verse 217 contain exclusively eschatological warnings rather than the establishment of a worldly death penalty. The hadith *man baddala dīnahu*, which has long served as the primary legal foundation for capital punishment, when applied through the principle of *al-mutlaq yuqayyad* alongside other contextually restricted narrations, is only applicable to apostates who simultaneously engage in armed rebellion and betrayal against the Muslim community, not merely on account of their change of belief. Consequently, a comprehensive linguistic approach encompassing lexicology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and integrated socio-historical contextual analysis holds profound urgency in shaping a more humane, proportionate, and just construction of Islamic law in addressing the issue of riddah.

REFERENCES

- Abidin, Ahmad Zainal dan Eko Zulfikar, "Epistemologi Tafsir al-Jami' li Ahkam al-Qur'an Karya al-Qurthubi," dalam *Jurnal Kalam*, Vol. 11, No. 2, Tahun 2017.
- Ali Syari'ati, *Humanisme antara Islam dan Mazhab Barat*, diterjemahkan oleh Afif Muhammad dari judul *al-Insan, al-Islam wa Madaris al-Gharb*, Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1996, h. 39.
- Dahlan, Moh, and M Ag. "Modern Fiqh Paradigm in Indonesia : A Study of Nurcholish Majid ' s Though" 7, no. 1 (2019): 169–89.
- David Jery dan Julia Jery, *The Harper Collins Dictionary of Sociology*, New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 1991, h. 218.
- F. Budi Hardiman, *Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia; Polemik dengan Agama dan Kebudayaan*, Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 2012, h. 1.

¹⁰Tony Devies, *Humanisme; Second Edition*, London: Routletge, 2008, h. 126.

Mujib, Lalu Supriadi B, Khairul Hamim, Mataram State, Mataram State, and Lalu Supriadi B Mujib. "Religious Freedom and Riddah through the Maqāṣidī Interpretation of Ibn ‘Āshūr," 2019, 1–10.

Rokhmadi, Rokhmadi, Moh Khasan, Nasihun Amin, Umul Baroroh, Criminal Law, Islam Negeri Walisongo, Universitas Islam Negeri, Universitas Islam Negeri, and Rokhmadi Rokhmadi. "Understanding Riddah in Islamic Jurisprudence: Between Textual Interpretation and Human Rights," 2023, 1–7.

R.L.Shinn, *New Directions in Theology Today, Volume VI. Man: The New Humanism*, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955, h, 24.

Tony Devies, *Humanisme; Second Edition*, London: Routledge, 2008, h. 126.

Wardani, Sri Rizki, Humaira Hananni Harahap, Info Artikel, and Article History. "Jarimah Al-Riddah from the Perspective of Islamic Law and Its Relevance in the Legal System in Indonesia" 6, no. 1 (2022): 38–44.